INTRODUCTION
Many regional and state institutions are formulating policies to mitigate global warming that will change the operations of, and investment in, fossil fuel energy facilities. The European Union has had a mandatory cap-and-trade market for carbon dioxide emissions in the power and heavy industry sectors since 2005, with the ambitious post-Kyoto target of at least a 20% reduction by 2020 and much more by 2050, depending upon international accords (BERR 2008 , European Commission 2008 . Other regions, countries, and states are following (Labatt and White 2007) . For decision-making in the electricity sector, carbon price uncertainty and the associated policy risks present major new uncertainties, the properties of which are quite different from the usual fuel, demand and market uncertainties to which power company managers have become accustomed.
Figure 1: Carbon Price Evolution, European Energy Exchange and European Climate Exchange
As an externality to economic activities, global warming is quite different even to air pollution. The benefits of air pollution controls accrue locally and regulations often set a credible framework within which companies need to adapt their operations (e.g., the US sulphur dioxide cap and trade initiative since 1995, Ellerman et al. 2000) . Global warming is truly global, however, in that the benefits only materialize through substantial international co-operation, and so there are policy risks of a higher order than the usual, notwithstanding extensive, regulatory risks to be faced by the energy sector. Apart from the fragility of multi-regional accords and the burden sharing agreements, there is uncertainty in the feasibility of targets, the social willingness to pay as well as the actual effectiveness of the economic and technological implementations, all of which motivate governments to maintain flexibility in their carbon mitigation measures. Policy risk is therefore an important consideration in the investment decision-making of the companies affected by carbon trading. Figure 1 shows the evolution of carbon spot prices in the EU since the cap-and-trade market for allowances started in 2005. Cap-and-trade markets evolve through stages of cap-setting. The first stage was [2005] [2006] [2007] , and it is clear that within that stage there was considerable volatility with many jumps in the price. Towards the end, the price declined to zero as it became evident that the cap had been more generous than original market expectations and consequently that there was no shortage of allowances in the system. Furthermore, allowances in Phase I could not be carried forward to Phase II. In the second phase, 2008-2012, spot prices initially rose with the apparently stricter caps, but since 2009, prices again declined with the economic recession this time mitigating the intended shortage in the market. Policy uncertainty for 2013 and beyond depends upon the tightness of the cap-setting. Uncertainty in the carbon market therefore has stochastic evolution within each phase of cap-setting, and jumps 1. In the study of Walls and Dyer (1996) all companies had an asset base of $50 million or greater.
between each phase as new targets get set. The impact of these prices can be substantial. For coal fired generation, each unit increase in the price of carbon per ton adds about the same amount to the marginal cost of generation, so that in the early months of 2006 and 2008, the marginal cost of coal fired generation was almost doubled because of the carbon allowances. On gas-fired generation, the effect is about half that of coal, so the policy intent is to motivate switching from coal to gas.
The conventional real option analysis to explore the timing of an investment decision is a well-known theoretical framework (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) , with extensions by, inter alia, Santiago and Vakili (2005) , Huchzermeier and Loch (2001) and demonstrates value in several practical contexts (e.g., Mittendorf 2004 , Tseng and Barz 2002 , Meier et al. 2001 . Faced with an exogenous carbon policy uncertainty, real options analysis would be expected to indicate a propensity to delay investments, and this appears to depend upon the technologies (Reedman et al. 2006 , Blyth et al. 2007 , with nuclear power plants in particular having different optionality properties compared to coal and gas power plants (Roques et al. 2006 , Rothwell 2006 . This theoretical propensity is appearing in practice, with press comments, such as "Shell has threatened to halt investment . . . as the uncertainty of this [emissions] policy is too high" (Gribben 2008) whilst Vincent de Rivas, CEO of EDF Energy in the UK comments that "we will not deliver decarbonized electricity without the right signal from carbon prices" (Crooks 2009). Also, regulatory uncertainty is mentioned as delaying work on biomass conversions of coal plant at Drax (p.26, Thompson and Quinlan 2010) . To the extent that delays in new power plant construction affect security of supply as well as the achievement of decarbonization, such manifestations are of serious concern to Governments as the UK Energy Minister noted, in 2010, the " . . . actions to introduce the transparency, certainty and long-termism needed to unlock investment" (p.23, Thompson and Quinlan 2010) . The purpose of this paper is therefore to analyze in greater detail how various policies on carbon pricing may affect the investment propensities of power companies, defined as the cumulative probabilities of investment over time, and hence further inform policy-making in this respect.
Whilst the straightforward option value to delay follows analytically from a risk-neutral decision analysis (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) , the investment model in power generation usually needs to incorporate some degree of risk aversion. In this respect, it is similar to the petroleum sector, e.g., Walls and Dyer (1996) . In particular, Walls and Dyer (1996) and Howard (1988) show that the risk aversion decreases in company size.
1 Explanations for this include observations that larger companies are more capable of taking larger and riskier projects because their asset portfolio is more technologically diversified and spread internationally reducing market, political and regulatory risks. In some investment decision analyses, real options and risk aversion have been implicitly combined 2. The general interpretation of a real option as "the right, but not the obligation, to take an action at a predetermined cost called the exercise price, for a predetermined period of time" (Copeland and Antikarov 2003) leaves quite open how its value will be calculated. using stochastic dynamic programming and large decision trees with risk-averse utility functions (e.g., Keeney et al. 1986 , Smith and Nau 1995 , Smith and Mccardle 1998 . In practice, however, companies are now more inclined to consider risk as a set of constraints within their financial planning models for investment, using Monte Carlo simulations of the embedded net cash-flow streams to provide risk metrics for cash-flow-at-risk (Froot et al. 1993 , Denton et al. 2003 , Minton and Schrand 1999 , LaGattuta et al. 2001 . Companies appear to be increasingly concerned about preserving various financial ratios (e.g., earnings to debt coverage ratios) necessary to maintain their investment grades with the credit rating agencies (Hempstead et al. 2007) , and the probability of falling below such critical ratios throughout the life of the project may be their most important articulation of risk. In our analysis, we therefore take this financial planning perspective on risk and formulate a set of intermediate risk constraints throughout the investment planning model. This modeling perspective is an extension of typical optimal power investment models which assume that new plant will be built whenever there is a positive net present value (Caramanis 1982 , Schumacher and Sands 2006 , Murphy and Smeers 2005 , Sen et al. 2006 , and even with real options (Reinelt and Keith 2007) , these would be inadequate to reflect any importance placed upon risk constraints. Furthermore, conventional net present value calculations rarely evaluate financial planning considerations such as optimizing debt exposures. We therefore extend the multistage stochastic optimization model to deal with these risk considerations and include real options to (i) postpone the investment, (ii) retrofit carbon capture and storage (CCS) for coal and gas fired power plants, and (iii) pay back debt earlier. 2 We do not value these real options using the risk neutral contingent claims analysis with replicated portfolios or dynamic stochastic programming approach. Our approach is similar to the decision analytic approach of evaluating the option to delay using stochastic optimization and values the investment opportunity with this and other similarly embedded options. Whilst stochastic optimization in this context is not new Rose 1995, Birge and Louveaux 1997) , we incorporate the real options, a new scenario generation approach, risk constraints, and a more detailed level of financial planning into the methodology. Our approach allows to compute specific cumulative probabilities of investment over the temporal domain, thereby focusing more precisely, than in previous studies including real options, upon the way that policy uncertainty, under various assumptions, affects investment timing. This focus upon relative propensities to invest at particular points in time is a new departure from conventional power investment models, but one that we think is needed to address the delay implications, in the uncertain context of exogenous carbon policies.
Our modeling approach is also motivated by Gross et al. (2010) who state that policy needs to look beyond the investment costs. Particularly, they conclude that "policymaking in the energy area needs new tools of analysis that can deal with the market risks associated with policy design . . . when designing policies intended to promote or direct investment." In this context, our investment framework accounts for the exogenous carbon price uncertainty and analyzes policies, such as enforcing cap or floor for carbon prices, CCS for older less efficient fossil fuel power plants, free emission allocations for new power plants, and accelerated depreciation. Also, we discuss how these policies and investment decisions are impacted by financial, resource, and risk aversion differentiation of companies.
In more specific terms, whilst it is clear that the mandatory requirement to cover carbon emissions from fossil fuel plants increases their marginal costs by the price of these carbon allowances, how uncertainty in carbon prices affects the investment in different technologies in the presence of real option to postpone the investment has subtle implications. Since costs get passed through into the wholesale markets (Fezzi and Bunn 2008) , if the fossil fuel plant, gas and coal, are the marginal price-setters in the market, it may seem that carbon price uncertainty will not affect investment in the carbon emitting plant, if it is financially viable, as much as in the infra marginal, possibly more capital-intensive, non carbon emitting plant, such as nuclear. This then raises the questions of whether risk aversion will have a larger effect on the non-fossil technologies, and how Government policies to reduce uncertainties will affect decision-making in different technologies. If it is apparent that there is a substantial difference in propensities to invest between the risk-averse and the risk-neutral, and also between the debt financed (i.e., financing via issuing bonds or taking loan from bank and paying interest based on the debt rate) and cash financed (i.e., financing using existing cash that could be invested otherwise in company specific projects providing an opportunity rate of return) participants, then, apart from the level of carbon prices per se, the associated policy uncertainty will have an effect on market structure evolution through a tendency for investment to be led by dominant incumbents rather than smaller independent power producers, leading to a more concentrated and hence less competitive market. This may be further enhanced if the resource-base benefits of a particular portfolio of existing facilities increase the propensity to invest. Finally, and more fundamentally, one might expect that risk aversion would generally tend to increase the propensity to delay. However, if the temporal evolution of risks is perceived as sufficiently increasing, the reverse may happen. We are therefore particularly interested in how carbon policy uncertainty may affect market structure evolution and most of the commentary on the results achieved is developed to provide general insights into this question.
However, in focusing specifically on the impact of carbon policy uncertainty upon the temporal cumulative probability function of investment, we do not seek to address the issue of technology choice. Rather, we envisage a company considering the investment decision in a new power plant of a particular technology accounting for the characteristics of the company which are not limited to the availability and conditions of the existing assets but include also carbon policies, financial considerations, and risk attitudes. We analyze in detail how the probability of investment by a particular date would increase or decrease, and how their relative effects emerge. Whilst a general economic perspective might view an industry with homogeneous agents each willing to invest in any technology, we take the observation that the industry is heterogeneous and that, providing an investment is financially attractive, companies will pursue technologies with which they have experience or to which they are strategically attracted. We do not, therefore, engage in a discussion of whether one technology or another is the most preferred, as, even from an economic perspective, that is so dependent upon fuel and construction assumptions that change rapidly (Milborrow 2008) . We do, however, address questions of whether carbon policies and other factors affect different technologies to a relatively different extent. Nor do we address, for the same reason, the issue of the optimal capacity mix for carbon mitigation (Roques et al. 2006 , Grubb et al. 2006 , Green 2007 , except insofar as identifying the effect that an existing technology portfolio might have on a singular new investment. Finally, we take a liberalized market perspective on power investment in that companies, without a captive retail market and an obligation to serve, will look at each investment as a project, evaluated on its financial merits in the market, distinct from a regulated monopoly which would engage in least cost long-term planning of multiple investments over a long horizon (Bloom 1982) . This single investment perspective is therefore quite distinct from the conventional capacity planning models that have been prevalent for many years in the context of aggregate planning, but we believe it is more realistic in a market setting, where incumbents compete with smaller independent power producers, and more suitable to provide the focus on the specific investment propensities that we are seeking.
Our research contributions are four-fold. First, our results show that the carbon policy uncertainty leads to a more concentrated and less competitive market structure. This is because, larger financially stronger incumbent players, which are typically less risk averse and can borrow money with a lower debt rate than smaller independent power producers, are more likely to make investments in new power plants under the extra risks from carbon policy uncertainty. This tendency to more concentrated power market is reinforced by the higher investment propensities of incumbent power producers with existing power plants compared to new entrants without existing plants. Second, the tendency to concentration, due to carbon policy uncertainty, can be reduced by supporting policies to establish caps and floors for the carbon price and allow the early transmission of carbon shocks to the market. In addition, our results demonstrate that the concentration effect can be reduced for gas and coal fired power producers by supporting the early CCS adoption. Third, this study shows that a simple broad diversity in existing power plants or a portfolio of existing gas fired power plants does not encourage new risk-averse investments, but rather, specific synergies, such as nuclear and coal, can be effective in promoting investments. This suggests a path dependency in the investment propensity depending on the existing asset base, which needs to be accounted for when policies are being developed. Fourth, our results show that the Government technology support policies will not be properly specified if the investment analysis does not incorporate concurrently (i) financial details, such as interest and depreciation tax shields, optimization of debt level, and financing restrictions, (ii) real options, and (iii) uncertainties.
The results of the study also provide some surprises that reinforce the value of accounting for company specific characteristic, as it is clear that in assessing the relative effects of carbon policy uncertainty and policy instruments, the "devil" is indeed often in the detail. For example, whilst one might expect the risk-averse participants to always invest later than the risk-neutral, we find the opposite occurs for coal and gas if their opportunity rate of return is relatively low, and just as surprising, that increased price volatility may encourage investment by risk-averse gas generators. We also observe that enforcing CCS for older less efficient fossil fuel power plants may actually encourage risk-neutral and discourage risk-averse investments in the competing technology, nuclear. We develop the intuition behind these observations in Section 4, but such subtle policyagent interactions would not have become evident without the precise focus of the modeling specification used in this research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the carbon risk investment setting and Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 motivates the experimental propositions and comments upon the results. Section 5 concludes.
THE INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
We focus upon the two heavy carbon-emitting technologies, coal and gas, where carbon trading will directly influence operational costs and investment. We also consider a non-fossil capital intensive alternative, nuclear, the properties of which can be generalized to similar low carbon, low marginal cost, high capital cost facilities such as hydro and renewables. A company is considering investment in one facility, in the presence of exogenous industry-wide carbon price uncertainty. The investment decision can be taken immediately or be postponed to await more information regarding the expected future carbon prices. Once the decision to invest is made, it is followed by a construction period, after which the plant can be taken into operation. In later time periods, a company can also make a decision to retrofit carbon capture and storage (CCS) to coal or gas facilities to reduce its emissions.
Given the industry-wide uncertainty and no exclusive right to invest, the value of a real option to delay the investment would, in theory, be zero under perfect competition if the uncertainty were endogenous (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . The carbon price uncertainty is, however, exogenous to the investment decisions reflecting the global carbon policy uncertainty that depends on the negotiated burden sharing agreements, emerging new information regarding the impacts of global warming, feasibility of Governments to set abatement targets, the social willingness to pay, and the actual effectiveness of the economic and technological implementations, for example. Moreover, power production markets are not perfectly competitive and tend to be oligopolistic by nature. Thus, a real options analysis of delaying an investment could be indicative in this context.
We assume that the company makes its investment decision without speculating upon the possible investments of competing companies and what impacts these might have. This is clearly a pragmatic behavioral perspective, motivated by the focus upon one incremental investment, rather than the dynamics of multi-agent investments. In a contestable market, the option to invest will be open to all, and it is plausible that awareness of competitive intentions and deliberate signaling will enter the investment considerations of all participants. However, we are not seeking to derive capacity equilibrium or forecasts of market evolution, but rather compare the behavioral propensities of different agents to analyze the signals that different policies set. To the extent that market participants may substantially follow these signals, a transition will occur in the market structure, but we are seeking only to understand how these tendencies may depend upon various factors. Furthermore, this assumption of the firm acting independently, though boundedly rational, may not be substantially unrealistic as it tends to be part of the explanation for evident investment cycles. Roques et al. (2006) discusses how "in the U.S. in 1999-2000 investors . . . saw nothing but cheap natural gas prices and started building CCGT plants . . . and led to the financial collapse of many investors." Herding occurs in power generation investments resulting in cyclical investment patterns as Ford (2001 Ford ( , 2002 demonstrate. This is also in line with the study of Bernanke (1983) , who explains that when investments are irreversible and the underlying stochastic process is subject to random changes, investment cycles can emerge.
Apart from deciding upon the timing of the investments, the company considers how the investments are to be financed. The investments can initially be financed by using full, part, or no debt capital depending on the asset circumstances of the company (see Figure 2) . Later, the company may decide to pay off some of its debt until finally the remaining debt is paid off at the end of the life time of the plant. The company's cash position is hence dynamic and depends on the revenues received, taxes, debt servicing, and depreciation.
The risks of the investment are the outcomes which result in lower cash positions than if the investment were not made. We assume that the company's objective is to maximize the expected net present value of the investment while acknowledging the credit risks throughout the life time of the power plant. The investment framework therefore consists of the following two modules (i) carbon and electricity price scenario generation and (ii) investment model and risk analysis. The first module generates the uncertain evolution of carbon and electricity prices using a scenario tree. The second module formulates the investment timing decision as a stochastic optimization problem using the carbon and electricity price scenario tree. For a particular technology, the model computes the optimal time to invest, if at all, over all scenarios accounting for the financial risk con- straints that are applied for the cash positions. Given the various financial parameters, the model then allows the computation of the expected net present value, conditional cash-flows-at-risk, and the cumulative probabilities of investment at each of the time intervals.
THE MODEL SPECIFICATION

Carbon and Electricity Price Scenario Generation
Exogenous inputs for the carbon price scenario generation are expected carbon price trajectory and the carbon price volatility. We assume that the carbon price is log-normally distributed and that the carbon price process follows a Markov chain. We model this carbon price uncertainty using a recombining scenario tree. The scenario outcomes for carbon prices and their probabilities are generated extending the "bracket-mean" method (Smith 1993, Miller and Rice 1983) for multiple periods (for details see Appendix).
In the generation of electricity price scenarios, we take exogenous assumptions about fuel prices and the electricity generation profit spread. The profit spread is a much smaller component than fuel in the marginal cost of power and exists when the power market is not perfectly competitive, which is typically the case, to ensure the recovery of at least long-run marginal costs. The profit spread appears to persist as a mean reverting process, rather than being a percentage of the electricity price, (e.g., Bunn 2004 , Hobbs 1986 ) and based on that, together with the fuel prices ultimately relating to oil, we can take electricity prices, together with carbon, to be exogenous. The wholesale electricity price scenarios are created with the help of fuel prices, the electricity generation profit spread, and carbon prices at the particular points in the scenario tree. These power prices are assumed to be set by the marginal generator, which could be gas or coal depending upon the additional supplement of carbon at particular points (gas uses about half the carbon allowance of coal for the same unit of output), see Figure 3 . Hence, the electricity price varies depending on the carbon price and the emission amounts of the price setting coal and gas plants. The emission amounts of the price setting plants can be reduced if CCS technology is retrofitted. We envisage this in experiments with the fast CCS technology adoption, for example.
Investment Model and Risk Analysis
The investment model, presented in the Appendix, is formulated as a mixed integer stochastic programming problem in which the investor maximizes the expected net present value (Birge and Louveaux 1997) . One of the benefits of stochastic programming is that the decisions are contingent on all available information at the moment of decision in the specified time period and scenario without any foresight on which of the possible future scenarios will occur. The formulation consists of multiple discrete time stages when the power plant investment decision can be made. Recourse decisions can be taken to adjust the debt amount and retrofit the CCS. The optimization is conducted over the whole scenario tree concurrently, such that optimal actions are chosen for all power plant and CCS investment decisions and debt payment decisions. Decision con-straints are set for the actions to depend on the actions of the previous time periods to enforce decision consistency, i.e., if the power plant is built at a specific time and scenario then this decision remains in all subsequent time periods and scenarios. We have included financial details in the model by specifying interest and depreciation tax shield constraints and optimization of debt payments. In the experiments, we consider also financing constraints that limit the maximum amount of redeemable debt to the cash flow to capture realistic restrictions.
The risk aversion of the investor is considered using the Conditional Cash Flow at Risk (CCFAR) measure, which is an expected cash flow measure conditional on a particular lower fractile of the cash position. It is defined similarly to the more general Conditional Value at Risk (see e.g., Rockafeller and Uryasev 2000, Uryasev 2000) . These risk constraints can be set for multiple points in time concurrently to manage the cash flow risks throughout the power plant's life time. This is important as investments in power plants are long-lasting and risk management applied only at the terminal period would overlook the realistic concerns of financial distress during the plant's life time.
Using the risk constraints we can define a risk-neutral investor as a decision maker who maximizes return in E[NPV] and a risk-averse investor as a decision maker who minimizes the risk exposure, in CCFAR. This is done by supplementing the objective function with the CCFAR risk objective where -kq the risk aversion factor if the function characterizes risk-neutral investor ‫ם‬ k r 0 and if it characterizes a risk-averse investor. The possible time inconsisk r ϱ tency problem of the risk-averse investor (see e.g., Boda and Filar 2006, Geman and Ohana 2009) , we avoid by conducting the optimization using the composed approach of Cheridito and Stadje (2008) , in which the risk minimization problem is solved recursively. Based on the findings of Walls and Dyer (1996) , and Howard (1988) risk-neutral and risk-averse investors could characterize the investment decision making of large and small power producers, respectively, although we do not necessarily presume that. What will be more interesting is to use these two criteria to test the sensitivity of various policies to risk aversion by investors.
Overall, the model, as applied here, is distinct from other approaches by including risk aversion using CCFAR measure, including financing constraints, and focusing on investment propensities. In particular, our approach considers the risk-averse and risk-neutral investment propensities for gas, coal, and nuclear power plants and compares the emergent effects of carbon price uncertainty, thus extending the work of Yang et al. (2008) , Bergerson and Lave (2007) , Fleten and Näsäkkälä (2010) , Patiño-Echeverri et al. (2007) who focus on risk neutral investments in one of these power generation technologies under carbon price uncertainty. Besides including risk aversion using CCFAR measure, our approach adds on the work of Green (2007) , Roques et al. (2006 Roques et al. ( , 2008 , Reinelt and Keith (2007) , Fuss et al. (2009) by analyzing the impact of the existing power plant portfolio on investment decisions and how different policy interventions, such as enforcing caps or floors for carbon prices, CCS for older less efficient fossil fuel power plants, and free emission allocations for new power plants, impact the investment decisions.
COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
The experiments were done with an evaluation horizon consisting of t‫,0ס‬ . . . ,6 time states, such that investment in a power plant was possible in time states t‫,0ס‬ . . . ,4 (i.e., ‫)4ס‬ and for CCS in t‫4ס‬ (i.e.,
). Each of the first 4 time periods were 3 years. The length of the t‫,0ס‬ . . . ,3 periods 5 and 6 varied by technology in order to incorporate the full operating life in the case where the investment is made at the end of period 4. Recall that the focus of this work is not to compare the economic value of different technologies, as in conventional long term capacity planning models, where considerable care has to be taken to evaluate alternatives over the same economic horizons, but rather we are seeking to test the decision maker's propensity to invest in a particular technology sooner or later against various behavioral and policy assumptions. In a liberalized market with heterogeneous agents, it is perhaps more relevant for Governments to understand the effectiveness of investment incentives upon particular players with their own strategic inclinations, than to envisage an optimal long-term, least-cost market planning solution. We evaluated CCFAR risk constraints on time states t‫,5ס‬ 6 which are the mid and terminal states of the investment, for the cash flow 5% percentiles i.e., ‫.59.0ס‬ We did not consider b risk constraints in the very beginning, since during the construction and the early periods of operation, investors would still be taking a longer term view on the project.
The optimization problems were solved with the Dash Optimization software Xpress applying branch-and-bound method. The base case assumptions are represented in Table 1 . The formulation presented in equation 6 was linearized and the equation 5 was adjusted for the different lengths between the time states. The binomial carbon price scenarios were created from log-normal distributions, which expected values are as listed in Table 1 and volatilities are 20%. The calibration of the carbon price scenarios is based on industry experts' estimations, extrapolations for several decades based upon approximately five years of actual carbon price data is not credible. In published research, carbon prices have been calibrated using several different approaches (e.g., Green 2007 , Roques et al. 2008 , Szolgayova et al. 2008 , Fuss et al. 2009 , Roques et al. 2006 , Abadie and Chamorro 2008 , Kemp and Kasim 2008 . Our carbon price volatility of 20% is in line with the volatilities used in such studies. For example, Roques et al. (2008) use 25% and Fuss et al. (2009) consider a range between 0-30%. Also, our other base case parameters are similar to the ones used in other studies. For example, Roques et al. (2006) report discount rates in power plant investment between 5-12.5% and the construction period for nuclear power plant to be between 5-10 years. Blyth et al. (2007) consider the lifetimes of a new coal-fired and gas-fired power plants to be 40 and 25 years respectively. However, as several of these parameters depend on the market conditions and power plant type, as for example with the CCS retrofitting cost (Kemp and Kasim 2008) , we conducted sensitivity analysis. In the sensitivity analysis, we explore the impacts of applying 50% variations for investment costs of power plants and CCS facilities, variable operating costs, and increase in variable costs if CCS facility is built. Also, we conducted a sensitivity analysis using 30% for the carbon price volatility. The sensitivity analysis supported the robustness of the general comparative insights.
Specification Relevance
Since an important aspect of our investment model is the incorporation of uncertainties, real options (i.e., delay investment, retrofit CCS, and earlier debt payments), and financial details (i.e., interest and depreciation tax shield effects), an initial set of experiments were undertaken to calibrate the relevance of these features against a simple, standard, net present value evaluation. Figure 4 summarizes this comparison using the developed optimization model with base case data and different configurations regarding (i) carbon price evolution (deterministic vs. stochastic), (ii) investment timing (fixed at t‫0ס‬ for power plant and t‫4ס‬ for CCS vs. optimization of power plant investment at t‫,0ס‬ 1, 2, 3, 4 and CCS investment at t‫,)4ס‬ and (iii) financial details (all debt paid immediately, no tax 
or depreciation vs. optimization of debt payments at t‫,0ס‬ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 with tax and depreciation). Remarkably, Figure 4 highlights that all of the power plant investments would be dismissed based on a simple NPV or return on capital expenditure ( ) analysis, yet they are all highly profitable when the NPV ROCE‫ס‬ o 12 c‫ם‬c /(1‫ם‬r) three behavioral elements are included. The simple NPV uses deterministic expected carbon prices, assumes that the investment in power plant is made at t‫0ס‬ and for CCS at t‫,4ס‬ investments are paid from cash, and that sub-sequent earning are discounted with opportunity rate pre tax without considering interest and depreciation tax benefits. For example, the conventional NPV and ROCE of the nuclear power plant investment increase from -£304 million and -20% to £352 million and 28%
of E[NPV] and E[ROCE]‫ס‬E[NPV]/(expected discounted capital expenditure)
3 respectively when the three behavioral elements are included. Including carbon price uncertainty increases plant's value as in the low carbon and electricity price scenarios losses are reduced by not operating the power plant. Consequently, the maximum loss is limited to the fixed operating costs of the plant (see equation 6). The value of the investment in E[NPV] terms increases further when the real options and also the financial planning details are included and optimized concurrently. The incremental effect of including financial planning details is strong as it increased E[NPV] for the nuclear power plant by £261 million regardless the overall reduction in profits due to taxation. This increase in E[NPV] is explained primarily (approximately 70%) by the reduced opportunity rate of return due to taxation (see equation 4) and secondarily (approximately 30%) by the effective use of depreciation and interest tax shield benefits. The inclusion of financial details, however, reduces E [ROCE] . For nuclear power plant this reduction is 9%. This is because the opportunity rate of return is reduced by taxation increasing thus the discounted capital expenditures. Figure 5 shows the investment timing and cumulative investment probabilities (i.e., at time t) with and without financial details. As might prob x t t ͚ s s t t s ʦ S be expected, the impacts are greater on the more capital intensive projects, nuclear, then coal, then gas. The effects are substantial and so any capacity modeling without considering the financial planning details would underestimate the propensity to invest in the capital intensive projects. They also suggest that selective taxation and depreciation incentives for these technologies could have material benefits, if policy were so disposed. The impacts of including financial details for the investment decision and profitability are stronger than the authors expected. Most conventional ca- 
pacity planning models in use by policy makers, to the authors' awareness, do not include the real options (delaying investment, retrofitting CCS, and earlier debt payments), financing details (cash vs. debt financed), and accounting considerations (depreciation and taxation). Furthermore, earlier work by Bunn et al. (1993) suggested that, in the context of a traditional large scale (non-stochastic) capacity expansion model, financial details are second order effects, but that analysis did not incorporate all of the three elements at the same time, nor, more importantly did it focus more precisely upon the propensities to invest. Thus, it seems that all of the three behavioral specification elements beyond simple economic NPV are important to include simultaneously in a precise analysis of investment inclinations.
Economic Interventions
The economic policy intervention variations were done from the perspectives of risk-neutral and risk-averse investors (i.e., large and small players respectively). We analyze the effects in terms of encouraging (discouraging) investments, i.e. whether the cumulative investment probabilities are higher (lower) and the "gap" in these probabilities between the risk-neutral and risk-averse market participants. We propose the following hypotheses:
• H1: Enforcing a floor or cap for the carbon price decreases the gap between the investment probability of the risk-neutral and risk-averse investors as the volatility in electricity and carbon prices is reduced.
(The desirability of closing the gap between the risk-averse and riskneutral players could be motivated by policy aspirations to encourage smaller companies and new entrants.) • H2: Enforcing a floor (cap) on the carbon price encourages (discourages) investments in inframarginal technologies as expected revenues are increased (decreased) because of the pass through of carbon into electricity prices. (Capital intensive investors, e.g., nuclear, may argue that they need a guaranteed level of policy support in order to proceed.) • H3: Whilst retaining the overall unconditional carbon price expectation, if Governments introduce major carbon policy changes, or shocks, in early time periods, these will discourage the investments of risk-averse investors, as risks in terms of volatility are increased, but encourage the investments of risk neutral investors as early shocks provide more information regarding the conditional expectations of the carbon price evolution. (This hypothesis is the converse of a belief, often expressed in industry, that Governments should maintain carbon price stability by holding back potential market shocks in the social cost of carbon for longer periods than their emergence would imply.) • H4: Providing free CO 2 emission allowances during the early periods for new power plants encourages investments as it increases revenues. The base case in Figure 8 (a) shows that the risk-averse investor postpones the investment decision in all technologies as it can thus (i) learn more about the expected carbon price and invest selectively in cases where risks are the smallest and (ii) have the CCS technology available at t‫.4ס‬ The risk-neutral investor does not invest either at t‫,0ס‬ as it balances between the benefits of investing early to earn revenues and of postponing to (i) learn and eliminate investments in the unprofitable scenarios, (ii) receive higher revenues on later time periods as the carbon and electricity prices are expected to be higher in the future, and (iii) discount the interest payments more heavily (see Figure 6) .
From the base case we can observe that risk-averse investors' investment propensities are actually the same for all technologies, since the risk-averse investments are only done in the same high carbon and electricity price scenarios when the downside risks are the smallest. More significantly the risk-averse propensities are all very low and substantially below the risk-neutral. Investment is much more likely, therefore, in any technology, by the risk-neutral incumbents suggesting that carbon policy uncertainty leads to market concentration. With coal, moreover, both risk-averse and risk-neutral investors prefer to wait for the availability of the CCS technology.
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Figure 7: Decisions to Retrofit CCS for Coal and Gas Fired Power Plants
Given Investment is Made Figure 7 demonstrates for the base case that the propensity to retrofit CCS, given power plant investment decision is taken, is higher for risk-neutral coal than gas fired power plant investments, being approximately 90% and 25% respectively. This is because coal fired power plants emit more carbon dioxide than gas fired power plants and can hence benefit more from CCS in high carbon price scenarios. Also, Figure 7 shows that a risk-averse investor, given power plant investment is taken, is more likely to adopt CCS than a risk-neutral investor. These results extend the work of Abadie and Chamorro (2008) , Patiño-Echeverri et al. (2007) by demonstrating that (i) the CCS retrofitting decision depends also on the risk aversion besides the planning horizon and carbon price and (ii) coalfired power producers are more likely to invest in CCS than gas-fired power producers.
The effects of floors and caps are demonstrated in Figures 8 (b) and (c) (for summary of the indications on all of the hypothesis see Table 2 ). With a floor imposed on the carbon price, the propensity of the risk-averse participant to invest increases substantially, and significantly closes the gap with the risk-neutral investor. This is very apparent for the more capital intensive plant. For coal, risk aversion does not make any difference, and for nuclear, there is only an apparent delay in the first three years. This removal of the corporate discrimination in investment may be more interesting for policy than the overall increased propensity to invest. In contrast, the opposite effects of the cap are most evident for the risk-neutral coal investor whose investment probabilities are reduced. However, the cap did not postpone the investment decisions of the risk-averse investors. Thus, we extend the results of Nagel and Rammerstorfer (2009) demonstrating that (i) price cap may not impact the investment behavior of risk averse companies and (ii) enforcing cap or floor can hence be a useful policy tool in reducing market concentration caused by carbon policy uncertainty.
To test the effects of having major policy changes in earlier periods, we include large shocks up and down in the carbon price at time states t‫2ס‬ and t‫.4ס‬ These shocks are modeled symmetrically by including additional scenario branching, such that the probability to jump up and down is 50% and the jump size, , ⑀ is 50% of the expected carbon price at t‫,2ס‬ i.e. ‫/5.31£ס‬ton of CO 2 . Hence, the ⑀ expected carbon price level at t‫2ס‬ if the jump is up is and if the l ‫ס‬l ‫⑀ם‬ at t‫,)4ס‬ and (jumps down at t‫,2ס‬ 4). We assumed these shifts in l ‫ס‬l -2 ⑀ 4 dd 4 the expected carbon prices persisted at time states t‫,5ס‬ 6 resulting in four times more scenarios in these time periods compared to base case. Consequently, the expected carbon prices at all time states remained the same as in the base case but the volatility was increased. This is similar to the mean-preserving increase in uncertainty as in the study of Bernanke (1983) in which he shows that an increase in uncertainty increases the option value and decreases the investment propensity due to the possibility of unfavorable outcomes.
As Figure 8 (d) shows the hypothesis 3 regarding the shocks is partially refuted. The increase in volatility encourages risk-neutral investments, which contradicts also the result of Bernanke (1983) that an increase in uncertainty decreases the investment propensity. The reason is that the shocks occur during the early periods when the investor can learn from them and make more profitable investments. This is particularly the case in the gas and coal power plant investments as investors have better knowledge whether to build the CCS facility. The early shocks increased the E[NPV] of risk-neutral investor by 12%, 23%, and 36% for nuclear, coal, and gas plants respectively, which is due to an increase in the option value as Bernanke (1983) states. The shocks also increased the propensities for the risk-averse investor. This seems to suggest, that it is not in the interests of Governments to "hold back" carbon price shocks from the trading mechanism, if they are beginning to emerge in the scientific awareness and geopolitical processes of global climate change mitigation. Hence, we extend the research of Yang et al. (2008) , who model a single carbon price shock and demonstrate that it causes delays in investment decisions, by modeling several shocks and showing that shocks do not have to cause delays if they are passed to market early on when they can inform investment decisions. Also, we provide new insights to the results of Fuss et al. (2009) by showing that longer periods of stability are not necessarily desirable particularly in the early phases when the additional information can guide the power producers' investment decisions.
The "free allowances" hypothesis 4 was partially confirmed in an experiment in which emission contracts equivalent of the emissions of a gas plant were provided for free during the first 4 time states if a power plant was built. This was an effective instrument to encourage risk-neutral investors as all of the investments would be made at t‫0ס‬ with 100% investment probability. This policy had no effects on the risk-averse power plant investments because the acquired windfall profits would occur only in the first 12 years, which after the same risks exist as without this policy. Experiments with a policy in which "free allowances" were provided for longer periods showed that also risk-averse investments were encouraged and gap between the risk-neutral and risk-averse investment propensities got narrower. Thus, providing "free allowances" for short term may lead into a more concentrated market structure by encouraging only the investments of bigger players, to the extent that they are the less risk-averse companies. On the other hand, providing "free allowances" for a longer term effectively reduces the carbon price uncertainty and can mitigate the tendency for more concentrated market structure due to carbon policy uncertainties.
We partially confirmed the hypothesis 5 regarding accelerated depreciation rules. By allowing power plants and CCS to be depreciated in half of their lifetimes, both risk-neutral and risk averse investments were made at t‫0ס‬ with 100% probability. But experiments with less generous depreciation policies demonstrated that only risk-neutral investments were encouraged. Thus, policies allowing little acceleration in depreciation may lead into a more concentrated market structure.
Financial and Resource Differentiation
Here we analyze how different financial situations, the availability of alternative opportunities, and an existing portfolio of power plants affect the propensity to invest. We propose the following hypotheses:
• H6: Higher (lower) opportunity rate of return discourages (encourages) investments as the hurdle rate to invest is higher (lower).
• H7: Higher (lower) debt rate discourages (encourages) investments as the investments become less (more) profitable.
• H8: Existing power plants encourage the investments of a risk-averse investor as the investment can be used to hedge risks.
In the investigation of the financial differentiation of the companies, we relax the assumption of having perfectly efficient capitalization and financing, where . We consider that a financially stronger company may be able to d r ‫ס‬r borrow money with a lower debt rate than another even though the opportunity rate of return may still be the same for both. Also, we consider that companies may have different opportunity rates of return due to different company specific projects (e.g., construction permits for certain locations, proprietary technologies, supply or demand contracts, available skills) for what the companies can invest. The opportunity rate of return may be marked up for smaller companies because (i) the cost if company comes under financial stress can be higher and (ii) a closely held smaller company may not be able to diversify and reduce risks resulting that owners require higher return. Furthermore, the opportunity rate of return may be marked up due to the management agency problem as the managers' income and career depend on the firm's success. By varying the debt rate and the opportunity rate of return it is possible to characterize a financially stronger and highly capitalized incumbent or a financially weaker and strongly leveraged independent power producer. Figure 9 (a) is consistent with the hypothesis 6 in terms of increased investment probabilities following from a lower cost of capital. It also demonstrates that risk-averse investor may invest before the risk-neutral investor in the gas and coal power plants. This is because risk-neutral investor is willing to take more risk in the tradeoff of a higher E[NPV] as the future carbon and electricity prices are expected to be higher. Note, also that as , the fid r‫5ס‬ %Ͻ r ‫21ס‬ % nancing of the project is optimal using cash rather than debt. If r‫%5ס‬ and cash financing is not available and the maximum amount of redeemable debt is limited to the cash proceedings of the investment, the investments of both investors are encouraged but the effects are not as strong as if full cash financing is available. Experiments with r‫%02ס‬ confirmed partially the hypothesis 6. The investments of the risk neutral investor were discouraged as expected, but the investment propensities of the risk-averse investor remained the same as in the base case.
Clearly, higher debt rate discourages investments, as suggested by hypothesis 7. Figure 9 ( Hypothesis 8 was tested by examining how the investment behavior of a risk-averse power producer with three existing power plants differs from a riskaverse new entrant. The existing power plant portfolio consisted either of 3 nuclear power plants, 3 coal power plants, 3 gas power plants, or 1 power plant of each type. Existing power plants were assumed to be of older generation, which efficiency multiplier u‫.001ס‬ In particular, our approach differs from the one presented by e.g., Green (2007) , Roques et al. (2006 Roques et al. ( , 2008 because we do not try to model what would be the optimal power plant portfolio when built from the scratch but instead consider how different portfolios of existing power plants impact a specific new power plant investment. As Figure 9 (c) illustrates, hypothesis 8 holds. This suggests that the investment propensity of a risk-averse power producer is encouraged by the existing power plants highlighting the importance of including existing power plant portfolio in the optimization model.
In particular, Figure 9 (c) shows that the investment in gas or coal power plant is encouraged most if the existing portfolio consists of nuclear power plants. The explanation is that nuclear and fossil fuel power plants are a mutual hedge as also identified by Green (2007) . In low carbon price scenarios a fossil fuel power plant is the more profitable while in high carbon price scenarios it is the nuclear power plant. The reduction in the risk due to hedging are 8%, 18%, and 23% when investments are made for nuclear, coal, and gas plants respectively in the presence of 3 existing coal power plants. If an investment is considered for a nuclear power plant then an existing portfolio of nuclear power plant encourages the investment most. This occurs because the expected return can be increased while risks remain at the same level. The risks remain at the same level because they are generated by the existing nuclear power plants in low carbon and electricity price scenarios, in which the investment in the new nuclear power plant is not made. What is particularly significant in Figure 9 (c) is that the encouraging effects for new investments appear to be quite selective, and mainly relate to coal and nuclear interactions. This adds to the research of Roques et al. (2006) demonstrating that a nuclear power plant investment is significantly more favorable when the existing power plants and risk aversion are considered. Figure 9 (c) also demonstrates that an existing, fully diversified portfolio of three different plants is not substantially advantageous, compared to none, for any investment, nor is a portfolio of three gas plants. This suggests a path dependency in the investment propensity depending also on the existing asset base adding hence to the research of Carraro and Hourcade (1998) who investigate the impacts of climate policy on technical changes. We also experimented with the changes in investment strategies of the risk-neutral investor in the presence of an existing portfolio. As expected, without any risk aversion, the portfolio benefits were immaterial. Note, 
that we have not included potential benefits for firms to construct power plants of same type due to existing knowledge and experience. These existing conditions would encourage investments in power plants of same type. The behavioral differentiation of the companies in the market may also stem from the different structural aspects related to the (i) profitability of the electricity generating sector, (ii) adoption rate of the CCS technology, and (iii) availability of the CCS technology. We provide the following hypotheses:
• H9: Harsher (More relaxed) electricity price competition discourages (encourages) investments as the revenues are reduced (increased).
• H10: Faster CCS technology adoption rate discourages investments as the revenues are reduced due to lower electricity prices.
• H11: Faster CCS technology adoption rate decreases spread between the investment probability of the risk-neutral and risk-averse investors as the volatility of the electricity is reduced.
• H12: Lack (Availability) of the CCS technology discourages (encourages) gas and coal power plant investments as CCS cannot be used to hedge against high carbon prices.
The effects of lower competition in the electricity sector with a higher profit spread partially confirmed hypothesis 9. Figure 10 (a) shows that both riskaverse and risk-neutral investments are encouraged when the profit spread is y‫/01£ס‬MWh. However, experiments with a smaller increase in profit spread demonstrated that only risk-neutral investments were encouraged. We experimented also with profit spreads less than £5/MWh and the results were consistent with hypothesis 9.
Faster adoption of the CCS technology was tested by including the CCS facility in the older, less efficient, and hence more carbon intensive marginal production cost plants at time state t‫,5ס‬ 6 (i.e., in the equation 3), which could occur due to regulatory requirements, for example. This resulted in decreased electricity prices at high carbon price scenarios due to the reduction in the emissions but increased the electricity prices at low carbon price scenarios with the o e additional variable costs of the CCS facility h. These effects are asymmetric and the reductions outweigh the increases, reducing the expected electricity prices. As a result, the E[NPV]s of the risk-neutral investors were reduced by 25%, 30%, and 40% for nuclear, coal, and gas power plants respectively. Surprisingly, all the investments except risk-averse investments in nuclear power plant are encouraged and the hypothesis 10 is partially refuted (see Figure 10 (b) ). The explanation for the increase in the investment probability is that the reduction in the volatility of the electricity price allows investors to make better investment decisions. Particularly, this is the case for coal and gas power plants because they can make better informed investment decision regarding the retrofitting of the CCS. For reduced probability of risk-averse investment in nuclear power plant the reason is that in high carbon price scenarios, when nuclear power plant is the most profitable and least risky, the reduction in electricity prices increases risks. For the same reason the gap between the cumulative investment probabilities of the risk-averse and risk-neutral nuclear power plant investments are further away from each other and hence hypothesis 11 is partially refuted. In particular, these results add to the study of Otto and Reilly (2008) by demonstrating that policies, such as R&D or CCS adoption subsidies, to encourage a wide adoption of the CCS technology would discourage risk-averse investments in inframarginal noncarbon emitting technologies, such as nuclear, hydro, or wind.
As suggested by hypothesis 12, investment in the coal power plant without an opportunity to retrofit the CCS facility is discouraged and the investment probability is reduced to 0% (see Figure 10 (c) ). The investment probability of the gas power plant, on the other hand, is not affected, although the E[NPV] is reduced, e.g., risk-neutral investor loses 25% of its E [NPV] . The reason is that in the higher carbon price scenarios, in which CCS would have been built, existing coal power plants are the marginal cost producers resulting in profits for the gas plants regardless of the availability of the CCS technology. Hence, the CCS facility is not as crucial for the gas plants in short term as it is for the coal power plants. However, the lack of the CCS technology could eventually force coal power plants out of operation after which gas plants would be the marginal cost plants and their profitability would then be eroded.
CONCLUSIONS
Overall, our analysis indicates that carbon policy uncertainty may lead to a more concentrated and less competitive market structure, which, although intuitive, has not, to our knowledge, been shown formally. This tendency for concentration occurs because larger financially stronger incumbent players, which are typically less risk averse and can borrow money with a lower debt rate than smaller independent power producers, are more likely to make investments in new power plants under the increased risks of carbon policy uncertainty. The tendency to more concentrated power market is reinforced by the higher investment propensities of incumbent power producers with existing power plants compared to new entrants without existing plants. Thus, carbon price uncertainty is an entry barrier for new entrants. Other possible entry barriers, which are out of the scope of this study, include market power of incumbents to (i) temporarily reduce electricity prices, (ii) build overcapacity, (iii) increase the volatility of electricity prices, and (iv) integrate vertically.
The tendency to further concentration due to carbon policy uncertainty can be reduced by selective government support mechanisms. Thus, for gas and coal fired power producers this could be through supporting early CCS adoption (but for nuclear power producers our study shows the opposite effect). Although not explicitly modeled, it is clear that similarly selective support for renewable wind and solar in parts of the EU (e.g., Germany and Spain) has encouraged market entry. We identify that policies to support caps and floors in the carbon 
price and the early transmission of carbon shocks to the market can help to reduce this tendency to further concentration. The latter is particularly interesting in that many market participants, generally the large incumbents, have lobbied for longer periods of carbon price stability to encourage investment. Evidently longer period of artificial stability will only delay larger shocks if governments then have to catch up with global trend in the cost of carbon mitigation. Also, we show that policies that allow more profitable power markets, such as (i) accelerated depreciation, (ii) tolerance of higher profitability in power spreads, and (iii) providing "free allowances," can on the one hand lead into a more concentrated power market if they marginally increase profitability and on the other hand can reduce market concentration if they significantly increase profitability. This study demonstrates that existing power plant portfolios are important in the analysis of the risk-averse investor in ways that can be quite subtle. A simple broad diversity, as is often advocated, or a fleet of gas fired power plants, as seems to be emerging, do not appear to encourage risk-averse investments, but specific synergies, such as nuclear and coal or even the scale effect of nuclear and nuclear, can be very effective in promoting new investments under carbon price uncertainty. Given heterogeneous market players the effects of government incentives therefore have path dependent aspects depending upon the resource based characteristics of the market participants.
Our results show that real options, uncertainties, and financial details, such as debt and depreciation tax shields and optimization of debt payments, are crucial in the investment analysis when the capital costs are high and the decisions are irreversible, and the debt and opportunity rate are not necessarily the same. The more detailed analysis can reveal substantial differences compared to the basic economic net present value evaluation in terms of the value of the investment and the optimal investment propensity and timing. Government technology support policies will not, therefore, be properly targeted unless these details are correctly modeled, but they could be very effective.
The experiments shed light on some surprising aspects. First, a riskaverse investor may, under certain circumstances, invest before a risk-neutral one, even though the overall cumulative investment probability is lower. This can occur, for example, if the opportunity rate of return is low. Second, early carbon policy shocks can encourage risk averse investments regardless of the increase in volatility. Third, earlier adoption of the CCS technology may encourage gas, coal, and risk-neutral nuclear investments in spite of the reduction in expected revenues due to lower electricity prices. Fourth, if the retrofitting of the CCS facility to coal and gas fired power plants proved to be infeasible, investment propensities in gas fired power plants are not impacted in the short-term despite the lower expected revenues.
Taking the approach of focusing upon the individual propensities to invest, rather than seeking to analyze market level equilibrium, can evidently provide complementary insights into the evolution of industrial organization and the formulation of public policy. Whilst the type of model specified here can become much more complicated, one of the interesting aspects is that within the class of large scale optimization models for the electricity sector, where there has been enormous research in the past 40 years, the approach taken here deliberately avoids seeking to model the full system of generators in a collective long term optimizing way. Rather it focuses upon the effects of incentives on different kinds of players in the market. This seems to be quite relevant in age of liberalized markets, without centralized capacity planning, captive retail markets and obligations to serve, but it does leave open many aspects of incompleteness, notably strategic inclinations such as first-mover investments, investment signaling, forward contracting, changes in firms' power technology preferences, and vertical integration. It also leaves open the endogenous aggregate effects if many agents in the market follow the same incentives. Modeling capacity investment in competitive markets for prescriptive purposes is clearly elusive, as strategic behavior has many drivers, and in a global context even more. Analysis of a particular market might suggest positive economic investment, but if the agents are mainly international companies, even better opportunities could exist elsewhere. Reflecting upon all of these aspects of corporate investment behavior, therefore, clearly suggests that modeling such decision-making in this context has to be very focused on developing insights into particular issues and their relative propensities.
APPENDIX. INVESTMENT MODEL Carbon Price Scenarios
We represent the uncertain evolution of the carbon price over a finite time horizon t‫,0ס‬ . . . ,T using a recombining binomial scenario tree. Each scenario s t at time t is a row vector with t elements. The moves in the scenario tree are given by the vector element that is 1 if the price increases, and 0 if the price t s i decreases in the scenario tree in period i‫,1ס‬ . . . ,t. The set of all scenarios at time t is defined as S t and it consists of 2 t scenarios . 
) and so on (for similar scenario notation see e.g., Kettunen et al. (2010) ). The backward operator b(s t ) is essential in the model formulation as it, together with the equation (10), enforces the decision consistency, which ensures that a decision remains the same over all consecutive sub-scenarios. In technical terms, this imposes the nonanticipativity principle of stochastic programming, i.e., the decision is taken without knowing in advance which of the possible outcomes will be realized.
We define F ‫1מ‬ (m) [0,1] r » ‫ם‬ inverse cumulative log-normal probability distribution, f bin (n,t,0.5) {n‫,...,0ס‬T} r [0,1] binomial probability distribution, e o ʦ » method. Equations (10) and (11) ensure that once an investment decision is made it remains. Equation (12) restricts the investment window when the investment can be done. Equation (13) constrains that investment in a CCS facility can be taken only if the investment in the power plant is done. Equations (14) and (15) ensure that more debt can not be paid back than is initially taken and that it has to be paid back at some point during the investment horizon. Finally, equations (16)- (17) provide CCFAR risk constraints, which are formulated analogously to CVAR constraints (Rockafeller and Uryasev 2000, Uryasev 2000) .
By replacing equation (14) 
